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Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar).
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 373
There is a growing feeling that something is amiss with the philosophy of religion
[40]. New movements of thought call for the subdiscipline to be more ‘humane’ [6],
more aligned to religious and ethical practice [14], more sensitive to affect [47], and
more aware of the political role of religion [4]. Where perhaps once we contented
ourselves with attending to a small syllabus of problems, philosophers of religion
are increasingly exploring new territory.
As new frontiers in the philosophy of religion go, however, a Wittgensteinian
reading of Thomas Aquinas might seem almost uniquely unpromising. Apart per-
haps from Hume, no single figure has had more impact on the philosophy of religion
in the analytic tradition than Wittgenstein, breeding as he has both disciples and
sworn enemies. Aquinas meanwhile has enjoyed a revival on the analytic scene ever
since figures such as Geach, Anscombe and Kenny drew attention to the philosoph-
ical depth of his work during the latter half of the last century. Moreover, the
reading of Aquinas through the lens of analytic philosophy has been recognised as
a distinct intellectual movement and discussed in scholarly literature [33]. Is there
really anything more to be said?
I think so, since there is a loose movement of thought which differs consider-
ably from the mainstream of analytical thomism which is both under-represented
in the contemporary philosophy of religion and has a great deal to offer it. Some-
times called grammatical thomism, this marries the thought of especially the later
Wittgenstein to Aquinas’ account of God in the first part of the Summa Theologiae.
It does this in a fashion which is stylistically engaging and practically orientated,
and it would be to the benefit of philosophy if it had a wider audience. The pur-
pose of the present paper is to go some way towards making that a reality. I do
not suppose that what follows will win many, if any, wholesale converts to gram-
matical thomism – and there are clearly moves that could be made against some
of the position’s central claims, about the nature of the theory of meaning, for
instance, or in refusing to affirm that God is a person. In this respect I am inviting
the beginning of a discussion enriched by grammatical thomism, rather than sup-
posing myself to be writing the last word. That invitation is, however, long overdue.
The two figures most associated with grammatical thomism are Herbert Mc-
Cabe and David Burrell, with other thinkers such as Brian Davies and Fergus Kerr
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also reasonably included (gender balance is not one of grammatical thomism’s mer-
its). Their approach to philosophy of religion differs from more recent analytical
thomism (although not from figures such as Anscombe, Geach and Kenny) in its
taking Wittgenstein seriously. Not unrelatedly, rather than applying a ‘thomistic’
approach to standard questions in the philosophy of religion, it often casts doubt
on the intelligibility or usefulness of those questions itself (for this reason, if for
no other, grammatical thomism deserves revisiting at a time when radical qustions
are being asked about the philosophy of religion syllabus). I understand this ap-
proach in Wittgensteinian terms as therapeutic: we are talked away from certain
unprofitable questions in the direction of more fruitful enquiry or (perhaps more
typically) ethico-political praxis or worship.
Wittgenstein is a divisive figure in philosophy, and Wittgensteinian approaches
to the philosophy of religion particularly prone to be misunderstood.1 As we will
see below when discussing Murphy, the Wittgensteinian focus on language by the
grammatical thomists has led some to confusion about the extent to which they
are committed (as they most certainly are) to a language-independent God. It is
worth, then, being clear at the outset. There is no commitment to any form of non-
cognitivism about theological language on the part of the grammatical thomists.
Nor does the fact that they take a therapeutic approach to some questions in the
philosophy of religion commit them to the view that all philosophical and theo-
logical questions are best approached therapeutically. As it happens, McCabe (for
instance) is a systematic theoriser over a wide range of philosophical and theologi-
cal topics: ethics being one obvious example.2 He is perfectly prepared to advance
positive claims and to regard philosophical questions as substantive and in need
of answer. So it should not be thought that what follows is an attempt to co-opt
the grammatical thomists for Wittgensteinian anti-philosophy.3 Rather, without
prejudice to other philosophical topics, the grammatical thomists think there is
something particular about the grammar of God-talk which renders modern-day
philosophical questions about God prone to a therapeutic approach.4 In his edi-
torial introduction to McCabe’s God Still Matters, Davies captures the basic idea,
and its implications for a re-orientation towards action, elegantly:5
Wittgenstein held that philosophy leaves everything as it is. Mc-
Cabe held that there is a sense in which the philosophy of God
leaves everything as it is since God makes no difference to any-
thing: not because God is impotent, but because God is the reason
1There is some excellent setting of the record straight in [2]. See also [5].
2On McCabe’s ethical thought see [24] and [28]. Note that here too the influence of Wittgen-
stein is apparent, especially with respect to concerns such as language, action, and intention. It is
important, I think, to resist the caricature of Wittgensteinian philosophy as anti-theoretical; this
will involve revisiting and contextualising Wittgenstein’s own comments in his later work about
philosophy and theories. Thanks to a referee for the additional example of McCabe’s paper Cate-
gories as an example of systematic philosophising (note though that this is very much systematic
philosophising done via attention to language) [19].
3The relationship of which to the historical Wittgenstein, in any case, might be doubted.
4This extends into topics in Christian philosophical theology. So, for example, in the debate
with the Myth of God Incarnate authors in God Matters, McCabe makes clear that he thinks
that the doctrine of the Incarnation presents a philosophical problem because we are tempted
to regard God and human beings as occupying a shared logical space. Rather than solve the
problem, the correct approach is to realise that the Creator cannot occupy a shared logical space
with his creatures. (And so, to say of Jesus that he is God and a human being is not nonsensical,
in the way that saying of our dog Lola that she is both a dog and a rabbit would be.)
5Thanks to a referee for pressing points discussed in the preceding paragraph.
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why there is anything at all. Yet McCabe was very much concerned
with the difference that people can make. [21, xiii]
In what follows I will reconstruct a grammatical thomist approach to the phi-
losophy of religion, showing that by attending to how we might introduce the word
‘God’ to our language we can make progress in understanding both the possibili-
ties for and the limits of talk concerning God. I will then address objections to the
grammatical thomist approach before demonstrating that approach in action, show-
ing how it can be deployed in the cause of a therapeutic response to the problem
of evil. This will lead into a brief discussion of arguably the most exciting prospect
offered by grammatical thomism, the use of a philosophical understanding of God
to undertake a political critique of theology and religious practice, and so further
human flourishing. For most of the paper I will draw on the work of McCabe,
although will refer to other thinkers where relevant. McCabe shared with Aquinas
a conviction that speaking truly of God was tied up with human flourishing. If the
thrust of this paper is correct, they were both right in this conviction.
1
Suppose that I want to elucidate for someone the sense of the word ‘God’ as
it is used in those religions commonly called Abrahamic. By ‘sense’ here, I mean
that component of meaning capable of contributing to truth-apt content; surely an
adequate exposition of the meaning of ‘God’ meanwhile would encompass its use in
acts of praise and supplication, the making of vows, expressions of joy and profan-
ity, and so on. Perhaps my imagined interlocutor has encountered the word ‘God’
in one or more of these contexts and wishes to know whether it is just a means of
expressing emotion or an item of linguistic punctuation, or rather whether those
using it suppose it to be capable of being used of something. What might I say to
her?6
My instinct is to teach her how to use the word in making assertions, by indi-
cating to her the conditions under which canonical sentences containing the word
‘God’ may be asserted correctly.7 Amongst these sentences are ‘God exists’ and
various predications of God. Similarly, an adequate introduction to the sense of
‘God’ will convey something of the denial conditions for sentences containing the
word, and of the circumstances under which its inclusion in sentential context con-
stitutes a category mistake.8 With one eye to these desiderata and the other to my
enquirer’s request to know whether the word God corresponds, I decide to begin
my elucidation by focusing on the sentence ‘God exists’.9
Now I take my lead from Aquinas, who in the Summa Theologiae offers famously
five arguments for the existence of God. Not wishing to evaluate these arguments
6It’s important to be clear what is not happening here: an argument for the existence of God
on the basis of a ‘nominal definition’ of God, of a sort to which McCabe objects [22, 16-7]. In
modern terminology, the difference is between an investigation at the level of sense and one at the
level of reference (see below).
7This does not commit me to a claim that a full understanding of the sentences consists solely
in the grasp of their assertion conditions. Indeed, I think take it that full understanding requires
also a grasp of the inferential commitments incurred by an assertion. The relevance of this will
become apparent later.
8I don’t presuppose semantic realism at this stage by identifying denial conditions with the
assertion conditions of the corresponding negation. On semantics incorporating a sui generis
speech act of denial see [38].
9I don’t intend ‘corresponds’ here in any technical sense, but simply as communicating the
seeming platitude that ‘God’ is about God. I would want to resist the claim that the word ‘God’
corresponds in, say, the same fashion as a proper name, but that is work for elsewhere.
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for present purposes, I nevertheless note that each proceeds from some feature of
the world to the existence of a creator of the world which, says Aquinas, ‘all speak
of as God’ (STh.Ia., Q1, Art 3, ob.). This reflects what is surely a focal deployment
of the word, to speak of the creator of all that is (other than that creator himself);
note that our concern here is with ‘God’ as used with the surface grammar of a
proper name, rather than that of a count noun – as in ‘the author of this paper has
three gods: coffee, Celtic football club and Buffy the Vampire Slayer ’.10
What I learn from these arguments, which cohere with the use of the word ‘God’
in talking about creation, is that I am entitled to assert ‘God exists’ just in case
there is something rather than nothing at all.11 Since there is indeed something
rather than nothing at all, or else I would not be in a position to assert anything, I
can say that God exists. The controversy lies a stage back, of course: many philoso-
phers will follow Russell in denying that the question ‘why is there something rather
than nothing?’ stands in need of an answer, and so will question the legitimacy of
introducing an expression to designate whatever answers that question [39]. Given
that this assertion condition for ‘God exists’ is legitimate, however, there are two
important results concerning the logic of God-talk.12
The first is quite simply that there is such a thing as the logic of God-talk, that
it is not simply nonsense. There are intelligible circumstances in our life in which a
sentence containing the word can be uttered with assertoric force, and this sentence
stands in inferential relations to other sentences. Given that this sentence has a
sense, it cannot be the case that its sole constitutive noun-phrase lacks a sense.
This point deserves some emphasis, since recent work by Stephen Mulhall has an-
nexed the work of the grammatical thomists to an approach to religious language
influenced by the so-called resolute reading of the early Wittgenstein [31]. On this
reading, somebody like McCabe, whose approach to God-talk has been given philo-
sophical statement in the preceding paragraphs of this section, is gleefully talking
nonsense, going through the motions of saying what cannot be said13 in order to pro-
vide us with therapy for our idolatrous proclivities, all the time keeping in our minds
the riddle of existence (‘riddle’ here having the sense of TLP 6.5).14 Whatever the
merits of this approach to religious language, it is quite clearly not McCabe’s. He
10It turns out that for Thomas is the Summa this kind of grammatical distinction lacks any
ultimate depth in the case of God, owing to divine simplicity. For an overview of this doctrine,
see [8].
11c.f. TLP 6.44 ‘It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
12The strategy described in this paragraph is to present, what Davies calls, Aquinas’ Existence
Argument, present in both summae as well as De Ente et Essentia, through the medium of
linguistic philosophy [7, 31-3]. A referee asks how regarding this question as having an answer
distinguishes the grammatical theist from a believer in ‘solipsism, Advaita Vedanta, a General
Unified Theory of physics. . .’. In some cases I think the correct response here is to deny that the
alternative view purports to answer the existence question. But assuming it does, the grammatical
thomist has two options available: (a) concede that the ‘alternative’ position is not obviously
distinct from thomistic theism (it’s not obvious to me why this is a bad result), or (b) argue that
the proposed alternative is illicit since it builds into its purported answer to the question creaturely
attributes of the sort that the answer to the question is supposed to explain (this argument will
be couched in terms of the grammar of God talk): the suggestions that the physical universe, or
a human subject, is self-explaining would be obvious candidates for strategy (b).
13And not, for aficionados of Tractatus scholarship attempting instead to direct our attention
to propositions which show something [37][43, 6.522].
14That there is any such sense looks a problematic claim for resolute readers of Wittgenstein.
If TLP 6.5 is sheer nonsense (and doesn’t, moreover, direct us towards sense-making propositions
which show something) then in must be incapable, in particular, of introducing a bespoke sense
of the word ‘riddle’.
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is emphatic that his intent is to safeguard the religious believer from the charge of
speaking nonsense: theology ‘is not concerned with trying to say what God is but in
trying to stop us talking nonsense’ [23, 215]. It is for this reason that he lays before
his reader how the word ‘God’ is used, in the context of an argument about cre-
ation, so that she can see that the word does indeed have a use, and thereby a sense.
This is not to say that there is nothing odd about the word ‘God’ for McCabe.
Preserving the strangeness of our talk about God, consonant with the thomistic
insistence that we cannot know what God is, McCabe often says that we do not
know what our use of words about God means. This form of expression can be
prone to mislead, and suggestive of Mulhall’s reading of McCabe. In order to see
why it does not offer support to that reading, it is important to be clear about the
multiple sense of the word ‘mean’.15 When you ask me what an expression means
you might, depending, on the context in which you ask, expect a number of distinct
things by way of a reply. You might be content with a translation or synonym of
an expression: ‘what does <<boulangerie>> mean?’ – ‘bakery’ or <<c’est une
magasin ou on achete le pain>>. Alternatively, you might be after the reference of
the word: ‘what does ‘Donald Trump’ mean?’ – here you’d be satisfied with either
a description of or an ostension at the referent. The position that every expression
in a language has a reference such that its meaning can be supplied in this sense
is a substantial metasemantic claim, closely linked to a representationalist view of
language.16 By contrast, that some expressions clearly are meaningful in the oper-
ative sense is uncontroversial; my name serves as one example.
Finally, a request for the meaning of an expression might be a request to be
brought to a practical understanding of the expression, that is to know how to use
the expression.17 In my view, following Wittgenstein and Dummett, this corre-
sponds to the primary sense of meaning, and under-writes the connection between
the theory of meaning and the understanding of a language [11] [46, 43]. Whether
or that is correct, however, there certainly is a sense of ‘meaning’ whereby grasp-
ing meaning consists in knowing how to use an expression: ‘listen to what she’s
saying about Donald Trump, she can’t know what the word “genius” means’. It is
moreover this notion of meaning which underwrites the denial that an expression is
nonsense; nothing is nonsensical that has an intelligible use in the language. In the
light of this we can clarify McCabe’s position on the meaningfulness of the word
‘God’ and our knowledge of it.
The word ‘God’, for McCabe, is meaningful in this last sense of having a use
within the language: the assertion of the canonical sentence ‘God exists’ is licensed
in response to the question why there is something rather than nothing at all
(equivalently, given that anything whatsoever exists, we may assert ‘God exists’),
and various inferential moves may be made from sentences containing the word on
the basis of its use in answering that question. We can grasp this meaning of the
word, which is to say we can have practical knowledge how to use it. On the other
hand, we cannot say anything positive about the reference of the word ‘God’, since
the considerations which give rise to the word’s use ensure that its referent lies
outside any intelligible category of being (a conclusion McCabe arrives at through
15Here I am drawing on [15].
16For a critical account of representationalism see Price in [36].
17Note that this is distinguished from the provision of a synonym since it cannot be the case
that communication of use consist in the provision of a synonym in the case of every expression
in the language on pain of it being impossible that there be a theory of meaning for the language
as a whole.
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a consideration of creation and divine simplicity18). There is then a clear sense in
which we do not know what we mean when we use the word ‘God’ without it being
the case that any attempt to deploy the word must issue in nonsense.
The grammatical thomist invites us to consider a way-in to the use of the word
‘God’ which both secures the sense-making nature of the word and, under very
minimal assumptions (the existence of anything whatsoever), the truth of canonical
sentences containing it, whilst also placing severe constraints on what we are entitled
to assert about God. In Wittgensteinian terms, they supply a way of understanding
the grammar of the word ‘God’, which provides a basis for subsequent philosophical
and theological enquiry and which does duty, in a fashion relatively uncommon in
the analytic philosophy of religion, to the stress on divine ineffability so often found
in living religion. It may sound too good to be true, and in the next section we will
consider charges to the effect that it is.
2
We are provided by the grammatical thomist with an account of how God-talk
can be introduced to our language. Two serious worries arise fairly immediately
which call into question whether the grammatical thomist strategy is in fact capa-
ble of explicating theological language in a manner which supports a theism of a
recognisably thomist variety. One of these relates to the question whether the issue
of God’s existence is trivialised by grammatical thomism, the other to whether we
are being offered anything that tells us about God, as distinguished from the word
‘God’. We will tackle them in order.
On the manner of introducing the word ‘God’ laid out in the previous section,
it is nearly trivial that any given language user will be entitled to assert that God
exists. Any plausible account of the relationship between meaning and truth is
going to deliver on this basis that it is true that God exists. All that is required is
that anything whatsoever exist. Yet surely this makes a difficult question, whether
God exists, far too easy. Reasonable people disagree about the question. And in
any case the tradition within which we are supposed to be working, thomism, has
distinguished itself by opposition to what may seem like a nearby argument, the
ontological argument, and to the claim that God’s existence is self-evident (STh.
I, Q2, Art. 1).
It is no good responding to this worry by attempting to defend grammatical
thomism against the charge that it provides an easy route to realising that God
exists. We have seen that it does. A better remedy is to embrace the fact and
explain why it is not the problem some might take it to be. In order to do this,
we should consider why it being a ready result that God exists might be consid-
ered unfortunate. I’ll address specifically intra-thomist concerns below. From the
perspective of contemporary philosophy and wider culture, however, the concern
is surely obvious: the question of God’s existence is hotly debated by intelligent
people and is pursued vigorously in ongoing philosophical research. It cannot be
the case that the correct answer to this question is apparent, and to claim otherwise
18Compare here Burrell [3]. A referee asks whether the appeal to simplicity here doesn’t
suggest that McCabe has more of a positive account of God than I suggest. It is important to
understand that, for McCabe (as indeed for Thomas), the doctrine of divine simplicity is a piece
of negative theology, denying that we can make of God dinstinctions characteristically made of
created beings. The grammar of God talk is constrained by the doctrine of creation. See Davies’
introduction to [21].
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is a brazen exercise of intellectual hubris.
If the question whether God exists concerned the existence of a particular object
in the world, to be pursued by evaluating evidence (whether empirical or argumen-
tative) for and against the hypothesis that God exists, then it would indeed be a
problem that grammatical thomism delivers such a decisive verdict in favour of the
hypothesis, circumventing the weighty considerations that can be assayed against
it and thereby effectively shutting down a lively research project. But it is at this
point that the grammatical thomist ought to insist that understanding the question
of God’s existence in this way is the result of a concomitant misunderstanding of
the grammar of God-talk. The word ‘God’ is not supposed to pick out an object
in the world, such that it makes sense to conduct a quasi scientific investigation of
whether God exists.19 God is not one of the items in the inventory of the world,
but is rather the reason there is a world at all. This being so, it is far from clear
that it is a problem taking God’s existence to be potentially obvious; for in so doing
we are not making assertions about the contents of the universe from our armchair,
but are rather acknowledging the universe’s own existence as real, contingent, and
not brute.
If this is right, why do so many people, apparently competent users of the word
‘God’, including religious believers, think that it is certainly not obvious that God
exists, and that there is a substantial philosophical problem concerning God’s ex-
istence? That such people exist is certainly decisive witness to the fact that God’s
existence is not always obvious (claims of obviousness can always be met with the
response, ‘obvious for whom, and when?’) Here a Wittgensteinian rejoinder is the
correct one: philosophical problems arise from misunderstanding the grammar of
our language [46, 109]. Conventional philosophical approaches to the existence of
God, which for these purposes include not simply the outputs of academic philoso-
phy of religion but also the New Atheists and many of their theistic opponents, take
it for granted that the purpose of God-talk is to pick out an entity in the world,
whose existence may be regarded as an hypothesis subject to evidential investiga-
tion. Those pursuing these approaches may adopt this theoretical approach towards
God-talk even if their liturgical or spiritual practice, for example, or the way they
talk about God outside the confines of the seminar room doesn’t sit comfortably
with it. The point of the Wittgensteinian diagnosis of philosophical perplexity is
precisely that we may misunderstand our own language, a language we competently
make use of when not indulging our philosophical instinct. In the light of this, we
can see the grammatical thomist approach to ‘God’ outlined in the previous section
can be viewed as a means of drawing our attention to the correct grammar of the
word by forcing us to attend to its defining place within the language-games of
Abrahamic religious practice as designating the answer to a question posed by the
existence of anything whatsoever, that is the Creator. Once we are properly aware
of this grammar, the temptations to make illicit inferential moves from sentences
containing the word ‘God’ or, more generally, to take the word to be a proper name
for some entity in the world, will hopefully subside. And once we are in this position
perhaps the obviousness of God’s existence might not strike us as something strange.
What though about the specifically thomistic concern that the existence of God
ought not to be self-evident and that, in particular, the ontological argument, which
19Compare here Wittgenstein in the Lectures on Religious Belief [44].
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might seem to have an affinity to the grammatical thomist strategy, is unsound?20
Taking the elements of the concern in reverse order, Aquinas’ objection to the on-
tological argument as such is the move from the existence of the idea of God in the
mind to the existence of God in reality (STh I, Q2, Art. 1, ad 2). Not only does the
grammatical thomist not endorse anything like this move, she is positively opposed
to anything like an automatic move from the discursive to the theological. The
correct grammar for the word ‘God’ is one thing; whether or not that grammar is
applicable is another, and depends on how things are in reality. The fact that, for
the grammatical thomist, the requirements placed on reality for the admissibility
of God-talk are decidedly minimal does not nullify this point. Moving onto self-
evidence in general, here Aquinas’ position is that God’s existence is self-evident
per se, since God is his own existence, but is not self-evident for us. We, not being
in a position to grasp the divine essence, can only know that God exists through
God’s effects. The grammatical thomist does not demur. An apophaticism about
the divine nature is built into her account of the grammar of God-talk, and her
account of what licenses the application of this talk appeals to what Aquinas would
take to be the most characteristic effect of divine action, namely the existence of
non-divine entities. In both cases then, the grammatical thomist is shoring up the
key thomistic doctrine rather than modifying it.
Another thomistic thought, shared widely across contemporary philosophy of
religion, might however seem threatened by the grammatical approach. Aquinas
takes ‘that philosophy which is part of theology’, as he describes much of what we
would now consider the philosophy of religion, to be a science which has God as its
object.21 But doesn’t the grammatical thomist focus attention not on God, but on
the word ‘God’? Isn’t a representation of God being confused for the represented
reality? By eliding use and mention, the charge goes, the grammatical thomist
subtly shifts attention away from what we thought we were talking about – God –
and leaves us instead discussing religious language.
Religious language is a uniquely interesting part of human communication and
deserving of philosophical attention. The grammatical thomist however, like Aquinas
himself, takes philosophical investigation to be capable of uncovering truths about
God, not simply about words concerning God. It is an objection to the grammati-
cal thomist position therefore if the charge of substituting language for reality can
be executed successfully. Two versions of the charge should be noted. The first,
directed not against grammatical thomism as such but against the general position
(whether in Fregean, Wittgensteinian or Dummettian form) that philosophy has a
particular concern with a linguistic or conceptual subject matter finds expression
in an engaging and sustained attack from Timothy Williamson in The Philosophy
of Philosophy [41].22 The other, instanced in Francesca Murphy’s God Is Not A
Story takes direct aim at grammatical thomism and charges it with failing to uphold
20Of course talking about the ontological argument is an oversimplification as, for instance,
Mackie points out [16, Ch. 3]. Aquinas’ target is Anselm in the Proslogion, but nothing peculiar
to that ontological argument amongst others seems to be essential to his argument.
21Or, more strictly, God, or other things as orientated towards God. The latter disjunct will
not, however, serve as a get out for a lazy grammatical thomist at this point, for a version of
the coming objection can be posed: for sure, the grammatical thomist is concerned with words
in so far as they are orientated towards God. How, though, can we reassure ourselves that this
orientation is towards something real and language-independent? To advertise my position in
what follows, not only is there no need for reassurance here, but the contrary position is the
product of a mistaken picture of the relationship between language and reality.
22For a more recent expression of Williamson’s metaphilosophy see [42].
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a metaphysical realism concerning God, focusing as it does on words about God [32].
Turning first to Williamson, he thinks that those who regard philosophical ques-
tions as concerning language misidentify the subject matter of the discipline. A
good example is provided by Williamson’s discussion of the law of excluded mid-
dle [41, 27-8]. The truth of ‘Mars was always either dry or not dry’ cannot be a
linguistic matter thinks Williamson. For instance, the sentence cannot be true in
virtue of the fact that Mars always was, or was not, within the extension of the
word ‘dry’. A translation test makes clear that the question whether Mars was
always dry or not dry does not concern the word ‘dry’. Translated into Serbian,
the question reads,
Da li je Mars uvek bio suv ili nije bio suv?
This translation, as Williamson notes, clearly does not concern the English word
‘dry’ [41, 28]. Of itself, I would argue, this does not show that the question does
not concern linguistic items; the sense of the word ‘dry’ is shared by that word and
equivalent expressions in other languages and could, for all Williamson has shown,
be the object of enquiry in the case under consideration. However, I am happy
to grant to both Williamson and common sense that the question whether Mars
was always dry or not dry is about the planet – whatever precisely being about a
subject matter might involve here.23 This much may be acknowledged however by
those who view linguistic methods as central to philosophy: the point is not that
the question is about language, such people would insist, it is rather that reflection
on language allows us to see that the question will always receive an affirmative an-
swer without empirical investigation (in the passage at issue Williamson is writing
about analytic truth.) More generally such a philosopher will insist – one in the
Wittgensteinian tradition, and in particular Wiliamson’s immediate target Dum-
mett [41, 278-292] – attention to language is distinctive of philosophical method.
It is not that we are not concerned as philosophers with the extra-linguistic world,
but rather that our access to that world is mediated via language.24 As Dummett
puts the matter, language ‘may be a distorting mirror but [is] the only mirror we
have’ [13, 6]. So when he himself goes on to engage in a book length essay on the
philosophy of logic and language, he prefaces it perfectly congruently by declaring
his commitment to making progress on the central questions of philosophy,
The layman or non-professional expects philosophers to answer
deep questions of great import for an understanding of the world.
Do we have free will? Can the soul, or the mind, exist apart from
the body? How can we tell what is right and what is wrong? Is
there any right and wrong, or do we just make it up? Could we
know the future or affect the past? Is there a God? And the lay-
man is quite right: if philosophy does not aim at answering such
questions, it is worth nothing. [12, 1]
The grammatical thomist applies the insights of this broad tradition of linguistic
philosophy to matters of philosophical theology. The subject of enquiry for authors
such as McCabe is God (were that not the case they would not be engaged in
theology, philosophical or otherwise25), but they conduct that enquiry by linguis-
tic means. In considering the grammar of the word ‘God’ we come to understand
how reality is such that this word is used intelligibly. This understanding is gained
through attention to language, but it does not follow that the subject matter of
23This in itself is an interesting question. See [48].
24A key conviction here is that the structure of language is a guide to the structure of thought.
25STh. Ia, Q1, Art. 7
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our understanding is itself linguistic. Of course, for the grammatical thomist, the
extent to which we can be said to have an understanding of God at all is very
circumspect. Following Aquinas, McCabe holds that we can know that God is but
not what God is, the nature of God is hidden from us (STh Ia pr. Q3). Our un-
derstanding of God, such as it is, shows us that God cannot be contained within a
shared category with other entities, and this fact is manifest to us in the marked
difference between the usage of the word ‘God’ and that of other noun-phrases of
the language, and in particular in the marked contrasts in the types of inferential
move licensed by sentences containing it, in the spirit of the epigraph from the
Philosophical Investigations.
To Murphy’s objection that they do not move beyond language about God to
the underlying reality, then, the grammatical thomist will reply that every reality
is linguistically and conceptually mediated and that whilst this is perhaps particu-
larly apparent in the case of the reality of God, of whom we can have no empirical
experience,26 that we come to an understanding about God through consideration
of our theological language no more shows us not to be concerned with the divine
reality than the fact that analytic philosophers have often approached the meta-
physics of causation through analysis of causal language involves them in a denial
of worldly causation. Attention to talk of God brings the philosopher to knowledge
of God. Yet there remains a lurking suspicion that Murphy will not be satisfied.
Do we really have metaphysical realism about God? If this is supposed to consist
in some grasp of God which extends beyond our ability to speak then we do not
(although part of what we are entitled to say about God is that God’s nature is
unknowable, so there is a clear sense in which God in reality transcends the limits
of our speech), but then neither can we be metaphysical realists about anything else
either. Grammatical thomism cannot be criticised justly for not delivering what
was never there to be had in the first place.
3
The grammatical thomist begins philosophising about religion by inviting us to
consider how the word ‘God’ might be acquired through asking the question about
creation – why is there something rather than nothing at all? That it may be thus
introduced draws our attention to constraints on the grammar of language about
God in a way that allows us to view certain apparently urgent questions about God
as arising out of misuses of language. Grammatical thomism, in other words, opens
up therapeutic possibilities for the philosophy of religion.
This is important since it invites a reorientation of philosophical attention away
from questions which have troubled the subject since the revival of interest in
religion within the analytic tradition (and, in many cases, since Hume and Kant).
In this section I will reconstruct a therapeutic approach to the problem of evil on
a grammatical thomist basis. The starting point is one captured well by McCabe
writing about the creation question,
To say that we have a valid question (one with an answer) is to
say that God exists; for what we mean by ‘God’ is just whatever
26Here a strand of the philosophy of religion which places epistemological emphasis on religious
experience might object. Engaging with this line of objection is work for elsewhere, but the short
answer is that, from a thomist perspective religious experience ought not to be understood (in this
life at least) as experience of God, as though we had singled out the divine reality as an object in
our world, but rather as experience of the created world (including ourselves) as transformed by
God.
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answers the question. Apart from knowing this, says Aquinas most
insistently, all we can do is point, as systematically, as we can, to
several kinds or categories of things that the answer could not be.
For one thing, whatever would answer our question could not itself
be subject to the question – otherwise we are left as we were, with
the same question still to answer. Whatever we mean by ‘God’
cannot be whatever it is that makes us ask the question in the
first place. So perishability, decline, dependence, alteration, the
impersonality that characterises material things, and so on – all
these have to be excluded from God. [29, 41]
The reasoning here parallels Aquinas in the first questions of the Summa The-
ologiae. We can come to know that God exists through consideration of the created
world, but we cannot know what God is. In the absence of a route to knowledge
of God’s nature, Aquinas turns instead to consider what God is not and develops
his account of divine simplicity. The grammatical thomists follow a similar path in
the light of analytic philosophy’s linguistic turn, asking about the conditions under
which we may say that God exists and the concomitant limitations on our language
about God. Once we have a proper realisation of these many philosophical per-
plexities, including crucially the problem of evil, will be lulled.
The problem of evil in its various forms concerns whether the presence of evil in
the world is compatible with the existence of God. The problem may be thought to
be a logical one, where the proposition that evil obtains is taken to be prima facie
inconsistent with the proposition that God exists (where God is understood as om-
nipotent and omnibenevolent), or it may be an evidential one, where evil is taken
to count against the existence of God.27 Either way, theists have responded with
theodicies and defenses of various kinds, inadequacies have been found in these,
and the theistic responses honed in recognition.28
That there are worries about the debate around the problem of evil from a
Wittgensteinian perspective is not news. In particular, Phillips has patiently de-
veloped the criticism that attempts to effect a theoretical reconciliation between
theism and evil are flawed morally and logically [34]. Yet the grammatical thomists
develop an especially fundamental objection to the problem of evil debate, focused
on the tacit assumption that God is a person. This line of attack finds its most
sustained expression in the work of Brian Davies[9] [10].29 To understand how a
commitment to divine personhood underwrites worries about the problem of evil,
observe that the problem (in its various forms) concerns the mutual compatibility
of:
(1) God exists.
(2) God is omnipotent.
(3) God is omnibenevolent.
(4) There is evil in the world.
Why suppose that (1)-(4) are not mutually compatible, where compatibility
might consist in consistency (for the logical problem) or some less demanding prob-
abilistic property (for the evidential problem)? Because we take the goodness at
issue in (3) to be moral goodness and reason accordingly: a maximally morally
good agent will eliminate as much evil as they are able, an omnipotent agent can
eliminate all evil; God exists, but there is evil – contradiction. Yet if we take
27The key text for framing these debates was [35].
28A good example is [1].
29McCabe’s earliest work in philosophical theology was on the problem of evil. See [30].
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seriously the grammatical thomist caution concerning language about God is it
apparent that when we say that God is good the goodness in question is moral
goodness? That move is licit if God is a person, since moral goodness is the good-
ness appropriate to persons30, but are we entitled to assert that God is a person?
Certainly we use a personal noun, ‘God’, to designate God and the scriptures of
the major monotheistic religions present God in personal terms, not by making the
metaphysical claim ‘God is a person’, but rather by presenting God as speaking,
getting angry, being in labour,31 walking by, making his back visible,32 and so on.
Here close attention to religious language is the clue to progress; the scriptural lan-
guage ought not to be ignored (after all, we are supposed to be doing philosophy of
religion, but instead the question pressed how language is being used in the salient
passages. The thomistic understanding of metaphor can help us understand that
the genuine use of personal language to communicate about God and humankind’s
relationship to God needn’t carry a commitment to God being a person. Moreover
the later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the heterogeneity of language use will in some
cases give us reason to question whether communicating information about God is
the purpose of a given passage.33 In respect of the use of the personal noun ‘God’
to designate the deity, it is here that proper attention to the grammar of the word
will allow us to see that, in spite of surface appearances, it cannot be understood as
referring to34 a person. As McCabe indicates in the quotation above, because the
word is introduced to stand for whatever answers the creation question, inferential
moves from the existence of God to the attribution of creaturely properties to God
are block. Our concept of personhood is, however, shot through with creaturely
properties. As McCabe writes elsewhere,
For us the business of being persons is extremely closely tied up with
the business of talking, of forming concepts and making judgements
but there is no reason at all to transfer all this to God: indeed there
are strong reasons for not doing so since this version of personality
seems associated with the fact that we are physical beings, part of
a larger material whole. [26, 9]
More than this, there is positive reason not to ‘transfer all this to God’, since
God is the creator and not a creature, and is not subject to change or temporality,
not simply an inhabitant of the world interacting with other inhabitants. But if
30Or at least part of the goodness appropriate to persons, who might be epistemically, aesthet-
ically etc. good, as well as morally. It is clearly moral goodness which is at issue in the problem
of evil. Thanks to N for this point.
31Isaiah 42:14
32Exodus 33: 22-23
33‘Review the multiplicity of language games in the following examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them–
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements– Constructing an object from
a description (a drawing)–
Reporting an event–
Speculating about an event–
Forming or teasing a hypothesis–
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams–
Making up a story; and reading it–
Singing catches–
Guessing riddles–
Making riddles–
Making a joke; telling it–
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic–
Translating from one language into another–
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.’ [46, 23]
34Or otherwise designating, for example through denoting descriptively.
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God is not a person then whatever is meant by saying that God is good it cannot
be that God is good in the distinctive way that persons are good, that is morally
good. Now if God is not morally good then the problem of evil does not get off
the ground, and can be seen as grounded in a category mistake.35 This defuses
the problem of evil as a theoretical problem, but does not of course prevent evils
from posing urgent questions for human existence and colouring the way religious
believers live out their faith. Once the problem of evil as a problem for philosophy
has been defused, the problem of evil as a moral, political, and pastoral problem
remains. We will see next how the grammatical thomist approach can contribute
to our understanding of the interaction between faith and politics and so provide
resources for a turn towards a more practical philosophical engagement with the
world in the light of a therapeutic deflation of the standing syllabus of philosophical
theology.
4
What does the way we talk of God have to do with politics? There is certainly
a substantial tradition in Western thought, encompassing Feuerbach, Marx, Ni-
etzsche, and Freud, which claims that to the extent that we involve ourselves in
God-talk we become complicit in limiting human freedom. Religious responses to
this tradition are familiar and have generally tried to show how it need not be
the case that theology enables oppression and exploitation. Incipient in McCabe,
and undervalued in engagements with his work,36 is an alternative approach which
serves to illustrate the potential value of grammatical thomism in reorientating the
philosophy of religion. This takes seriously that talk of God (or the gods) is used
to damage human beings and legitimate them being kept in situations which pre-
vent them from flourishing. The apophaticism contained within the grammatical
thomist approach is linked to the biblical exodus and the rejection of the ‘gods of
the nations’ to motivate an account of God’s status as not being amongst the con-
tents of the world, but rather being the creator of it, as integral to God’s capacity
to liberate:37
[I]t is the God of the Hebrews (who in the Jewish interpretation
comes to be seen as creator) who is hailed in the decalogue as lib-
erator; it is the gods (parts of history) and the whole religion of the
gods that is seen to stand for alienation and dependency. ‘I am the
Lord38 your God who brought you out of slavery; you shall have no
gods.’
35That is, there is something infelicitous about saying ‘God is morally good’ because of the
grammar of the constitutive expressions. I don’t think that taking this position need commit one
to any particular theory of category mistakes. For the state of the art on these see [17].
36At the time of McCabe’s death a number of obituaries and appreciations presented him as a
brilliant theologian and philosopher who, incidentally, had somewhat eccentric political commit-
ments. On my reading of McCabe this is a mistake – although McCabe is clear that his socialist
politics couldn’t be derived from his Catholic faith, he is very clear that how one thinks about God
(or the gods) has a powerful effect, for better or worse, on one’s political comportment towards
one’s fellow human beings [20].
37This was significant at the time of McCabe’s writing because exactly the opposite move was
common amongst liberation theologians and others – change, or the capacity to suffer with us,
must be part of God’s nature if God is to liberate.
38I have replaced the filling out of the tetragrammaton.
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God the creator, who is not one of the participants in history but
the mover of Cyrus and of all history, is the liberator fundamentally
because he is not a god, because there are no gods, or at least no
gods to be worshiped. This leaves history in human hands under
the judgement of God. Human misery can no longer be attributed
to the gods and accepted with resignation or evaded with sacrifices.
The long slow process can begin of identifying the human roots of
oppression and exploitation, just as the way now lies open for the
scientific understanding and control of the forces of nature. [29, 43]
To reconstruct what is going on here: anthropomorphic conceptions of deity, of
the kind human societies have a tendency to worship (why they do this is some-
thing on which Hume, Marx, and Freud may be able to shed light) facilitate unjust
power relations and human suffering. Because, on these conceptions, God (or the
gods) is an inhabitant of the world, God may be identified as causally responsi-
ble for particular features of the world (to which we may then become resigned,
since they are ‘God’s will’). Since God is a person like us, we might attempt to
bargain with him over our condition (rather than co-operate at a human level to
make it better). More generally, since as another object in the world God’s agency
is disjoint from our own – if we φ then God is not φ-ing and vice versa – then to
the extent that we are pious we will not be prone to take charge of our own des-
tiny, lest our action to change the world display a lack of belief in divine providence.
McCabe’s response is that once we see clearly that God is other than the world –
as both grammatical thomist natural theology and the biblical theology of creation
enable us to do – we ought no longer to be tempted to invoke God as an agent
in our social affairs and are set free to understand and transform them ourselves.
The diagnosis of anthropomorphism is followed by a remedy, the disenchantment of
society : we ought not to blame on divine agency what has been brought about by
ourselves. As Marx put the point ‘the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism
of earth’ [18, 34]. Of course, for the grammatical thomist, everything in the world,
and inter alia political states of affairs, movements, and events, is brought about
by God as creator. The point is that it is a mistake to suppose that this excludes
our own agency. God the creator is not in metaphysical competition with ourselves.
Once this point has been taken on board, a new task for the philosophy of religion
can be envisaged: examining the ways in which the misuse of language about God
is complicit in exploitation and oppression, criticising this, and demonstrating how
a more cautious approach to speaking of the divine can frustrate this complicity.
McCabe’s own political passion was for the urgent work, undervalued in contem-
porary analytic philosophy, of tackling class exploitation [25]. Complementary to
this, a good deal of feminist thought about religion has drawn attention to the
ways language and imagery about God can reinforce gender oppression, and this
area seems ripe for engagement along grammatical thomist lines.
In an article such as this I can do no more than gesture in the direction of future
work. It is a curiosity deserving of note though that, whilst the texts of the world’s
religions often display a passionate interest in human lives and societies, the focus
of philosophy of religion in the analytic tradition has been on questions concerning
God in Godself, or more latterly with specifically doctrinal questions (the coherence
of belief in the Incarnation, the atonement, and so on). The grammatical thomist
project, if executed more generally than it has been to date, has the potential to
show that many of the questions that have troubled philosophy of religion arise out
of grammatical misunderstanding and to direct our attention instead to matters
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of practical concern, where its insistence on the distinction between creator and
creatures provides a basis for political critique.
5
‘Christianity is not a doctrine’, wrote Wittgenstein in the notes later collected
together as Culture and Value, ‘not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and
will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes
place in human life’ [45]. I have no desire to add to the already mammoth literature
on what Wittgenstein meant by the religious remarks scattered throughout his
output, and I would certainly want to qualify the claim that Christianity (amongst
other religions) is ‘not a doctrine’ – it certainly involves doctrines. When all that is
said, though, there is a reading of these words on which Wittgenstein is profoundly
right. Religion is concerned with human life, and needs constantly to be cautioned
against the temptation to bury itself in abstruse speculation at the expense of that
life. Grammatical thomism turns our minds back to earth, through showing us how
God is the creator, the world God’s creation, and ushering our thought to respect
the integrity of each. In this it follows Aquinas himself and has a lot to offer the
contemporary world.
*
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